Possible Future Mechanisms

There can be other improvements in the $BATCH ecosystem design, based on the empirical data and feedback.


A burning mechanism can be implemented in order to drive $BATCH’s value. This can be done by keeping a small portion of the collected fees apart (maybe 5%) and periodically evaluating ecosystem growth opportunities such as giving out grants to ecosystem projects or airdrops to the most active users. After evaluations, if the ecosystem growth projects (grants, airdrops etc.) have a greater expected value than simply burning the tokens, the funds will be used for these projects.


$BATCH token can also become a governance token when FirstBatch Foundation or a DAO is launched at some point.

Curation Markets/Staking

One of the most popular and most basic token mechanisms out there is the curation market mechanism where there is a market to be included in a certain list. A Token Curated List (TCR) is a type of curation market where the actors hold or stake a number of tokens to be included in a list, and take the risk of losing their tokens if they are voted out of the list because of breaking a rule. In FirstBatch’s context, a TCR would not work for individual data points because the content is not recommended by a popularity vote, the feeds are curated using AI. But a TCR could work for selecting bridgers: after a voting process by a DAO or the FirstBatch foundation, projects with enough $BATCH stake get verified as bridgers and their stake can be slashed once there is a vote to exclude them from the list.
Another way the staking mechanism can be updated is by creating a separate staking pool for each bridger and letting people bet on which bridger will get more queries. These stake amounts can act as credibility weights for the bridgers and users can get more rewards if the bridger they selected indeed gets more queries.
While these are both potential upgrades to the current staking mechanism and have the potential to drive the token’s value more, they create an unnecessary barrier to entry and an unrealistic expectation of voter involvement to work at the beginning stages of the token. However, these ideas or their modified versions can be implemented once the token ecosystem grows beyond a certain point.